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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'l'lLi\.DE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
S'l1A'l1 J1J OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SKAGG8 DRlTCl CENTT~RS, INC., 
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC., 
(J.J,/a W,\RSHA\V'S GIANT FOOD 
and UHAND CENTRAL DRUGS, INC., 
Def e 11dants-Res po 11dcnts, 
"\ ~D lrrl1 ,:\H I-n<~'l'AIL GROCERS' 
ASSOCTA '11 ION, 
In tcrvenor-AzJpcllant. 
P·etition for Rehearing 
Case No. 
11034 
'l'he clefe11da11t, Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., (herein-
ufler calk·d, "Skaggs"), petitioner in the above entitled 
case No. 11034, in which a decision was filed by this 
eomt on November 1, 1968, ren~rsing a jndgment of 
tlH· Dit-ltrict Court of Salt Lake Connty, Utah, hereby 
1·<·spt•dfnll~Y p<c•titions the court for a rehearing, and in 
~ll[lport thereof represrnts: 
1. '1'he Supreme Court failed to consider or rule 
upon tlw tliird defense of Skaggs to Count II of plain-
1 
tiff's complaint and failed to considPr the finding11 of 
fact and conclusions of law of the trial court with respect 
thereto which found that Skaggs had offered the goods 
in question for sale in an endeavor to meet the price 
of its competitor and which concluded Section 13-5-12( d) 
of the Utah Unfair Practices Act to be unconstitutionally 
vague and ambiguous and unenforceable if construed as 
requiring a retailer to determine at his peril whether 
a competitor's price is "legal." 
2. The Supreme Court failed to consider or rule 
upon the Second Defense of Skaggs' to Count III of 
plaintiff's complaint and the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of the trial court with respect thereto 
which concluded that the giving away of an item of 
merchandise in connection with a sale, is not prohibited 
by the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
3. The Supreme Court failed to consider the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court 
with respect to Count IV of plaintiff's complaint which 
found that the sale in question was not made by Skaggs 
,vith the intent and purpose of unfairly diverting trade 
from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor bnt 
was made with the sole purpose of inducing the purchase 
of other merchandise by its own customers and which 
concluded that a sale made with such intent cannot he 
constitutionally prohibited by the legislature. 
4. The Supreme Court failed to consider or rnle 
upon the defense of Skaggs that the Utah Unfair Prac-
tices Act is unconstitutional because of its unjustifiable 
discrimination between parties similarly situated. 
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5. The Supreme Court apparently overlooked the 
testimony at the trial establishing the fact that it is 
impossible to prove the actual cost of selling an item of 
merchandise and establishing that credits and rebates 
cannot be applied to an item of merchandise at the time 
a retailer sets the price of that merchandise for sale. 
6. The Supreme Court overlooked controlling prin-
ciples of constitutional law in holding that the unfair 
practices act is not unconstitutionally vague and am-
biguous. 
7. The Supreme Court apparently misread the pre-
sumption of illegal intent which is created by Section 
13-5-9 ( 2) of the Utah Unfair Practices Act and appar-
ently overlooked the testimony at the trial and con-
trolling principles of constitutional law concerning such 
presumption in connection with Count VI of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
8. The Supreme Court apparently overlooked its 
own vrior decisions in holding that the Utah Unfair 
Praetices Act does not violate Article XII, Section 20 
of the Utah Constitution. 
3 
Brief in Support of P'etition 
ARGUMENT 
In addition to the constitutionality of the Utah Un-
fair Practices Act, the defendant Skaggs raised other 
def ens es to certain of the counts in plaintiff's complaint. 
These defenses required the trial court to make interpre-
tation of various sections of the Act and all of the inter-
pretations of the Act by the trial court were before the 
Supreme Court on appeal. Among the questions raised 
were: (a) Whether a retailer in meeting prices of his 
competitor comes within the exemption set forth in 13-
5-12( d) of the Act where his competitor's price is below 
cost as defined by the Act, and what the retailer must 
do in order to come within that exemption; (b) Whetlwr 
the giving away of an item of merchandise in connection 
·with a sale is prohibited by the Act; ( c) ·whether a sak 
below cost as defined by the Act which is made with 
the sole purpose of inducing the purchase of other mer-
chandise can be constitutionally prohibited by the Act: 
( d) The interpretation of the presumption of illegal 
intent created by Section 13-5-9 ( 2) of the Act. Tltl' 
answers to these questions were not given by the Su-
preme Court although they were before it on appeal. 
Obtaining the answers to these questions is important 
since if the Act is held constitutional, these questions 
' involving the interpretation of the Act determine ·wl1etl1l'r 
or not Skaggs has other valid defenses to the conn ts set 
forth in plaintiff's complaint. The determination of 
these questions is probably even more important to tlw 
Utah Retail Industry as a whok, since wit110nt the r.n-
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swers to these questions a retailer will not know what 
he may or may not do in the fuure to avoid violating 
the Act. 
Obtaining the Supreme Court's answers to the fore-
going questions is important of course, only if the court 
clPtcrrnines that the Act is constitutional. It is Skaggs 
01Jinion that the Act is unconstitutional and that the Su-
lll'PllW Court failed to consider constitutional questions 
raised on appeal and overlooked controlling principles 
of constitutional law and prior decisions of this court in 
holding- the Act constitutional. 
It is respectfully submitted that a rehearing should 
he granted so that the court can reexamine its holding 
ihat the Act is constitutional and so that if the court 
continues to hold the Act constitutional the vital ques-
tions inYolving the interpretation of the Act, which have 
not hP('H passed uvon by this court, can be resoked. 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
OR RULE UPON THE THIRD DEFENSE OF 
SKAGGS TO COUNT II OF PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF 
THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT THERETO, 
WHICH FOUND THAT SKAGGS HAD OFFERED 
THE GOODS IN QUESTION FOR SALE IN AN EN-
DEAVOR TO MEET THE PRICE OF ITS COMPETI-
TOR, AND WHICH CONCLUDED SECTION 13-5-
12( d) OF THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT TO 
BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNENFORCEABLE IF CONSTRUED AS RE-
QUIRING A RETAILER TO DETERMINE AT HIS 
PERIL WHETHER A COMPETITOR'S PRICE IS 
"LEGAL." 
Count II of plainiff's complaint alleged that on June 
23, 1966, Skaggs advertised and sold Style Hair Spray 
for 49¢, which was less than cost as defined by Section 
13-5-7 of the Utah Unfair Practices Act. In answer to 
this count Skaggs alleged that on or about June 16, 1966, 
Shoppers Discount, a competitor of Skaggs, advertised 
and sold Aqua Net Hair Spray at 49¢ and that tlw 
advertisement by Skaggs of Style Hair Spray at 49¢ 
was made in an endeavor by Skaggs to meet the price of 
Shoppers Discount on Aqua Net Hair Spray and was 
accordingly exempt under the provision of Section 13-5-
12 ( d) which provides : 
"13-5-12 Sales Exempt from Act. The Provi-
sions of this Act shall not apply to any sale made: 
"(d) in an endeavor made in good faith to 
meet legal prices of a competitor as herein de-
fined selling the same article, product or com-
modity in the same locality or trade area." 
In connection with Count II of plaintiff's complaint, 
the trial ocurt found that on or about J nne lG, 1966, 
Shopper's Discount advertised and sold Aqua Net hair 
spray at 49¢ which was a sale below cost as defined by 
the Act. On June 23, 1966, Skaggs advertised Style hair 
spray at 49¢ which was a sale below cost as defined by 
the Act. Aqua Net hair spray and Style hair spray are 
comparable products with regard to weight, size, use, 
price and customer dt>mand. Shopper's Discount and 
Skaggs are competitors in the same locality or trade 
area comprising Salt Lake City and Davis County. 
Skaggs' advertisement and sale of Style hair spray at 
49¢ was made in an endeavor by Skaggs to meet the 49¢ 
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price of Shopper's Discount on Aqua Net hair spray. 
Skaggs had no actual knowledge that the Shoppers' Dis-
count price on Aqua Net hair spray was not a legal 
price under the provisions of Section 13-5-12 of the Act. 
Aqua Net hair spray is a product with wide wholesale 
priee fluctuations which can be purchased by retailers, 
including Skaggs and Shopper's Discount in numerous 
\mys and from many different suppliers. Skaggs had 
not made any inquiry of Shopper's Discount or of the 
trnppliers of Aqua Net hair spray to determine the in-
-v-oice cost of Aqua Net hair spray to Shopper's Discount. 
f;hoppPr's Discount as a competitor of Skaggs would not 
-.;olnntarily supply defendant's with information relative 
to its invoice cost, replacement cost or date of purchase 
of the item, and wide price fluctuation and numerous 
wholesalt> sources of supply and differing purchase 
methods made it infeasible and unrealistic for Skaggs to 
ohtain reliable information of invoice costs, replacement 
('Osb, or date of purchase of Aqua Net hair spray by 
Nhopper's Discount. 
'ThP trial court concluded that Skaggs was entitled 
tc. med the price of Shopper's Discount and to assume 
that the advertised price of Shopper's Discount was a 
legal price in the absence of actual knowledge of an 
i11eg-al sale by Shopper's Discount in violation of the 
ud and. that Section 13-5-12 ( d) would be unconstitu-
tional if construed as requiring a retailer to determine 
at hi:-; iwril wlwtlwr his competitor's price is "legal." 
'l'he Utah Supreme Court did not consider the de-
frrnw of Skaggs to Count II of plaintiff's complaint or 
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the findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect 
to this defense, although the matter was presented to 
the Supreme Court on appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
trial court on this point should be affirmed. As stated 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Com-
monwealth vs. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 At.2d 67 (1940), 
''How could a merchant know whether a selling price 
which he proposed to fix was legal because it met the 
"legal price of a competitor for merchandise of the same 
grade, quantity and quality? How could such a legal 
price of a competitor be ascertairn•d without examining 
the competitor's books in order to determine whether 
his price was legal?" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
\Vent on to hold the Pennsylvania Unfair Practices Act 
unconstitutional on the grounds it was so vague, indef-
inite and incapable of practical application as to make 
its enforcement a violation of due process. 
A provision of the New Jersey e nfair Practices Act 
identical to Section 13-5-12( d) of the Utah Act was held 
unconstitutional by the New Jersey Supreme Conrt in 
the case of State vs. Packard-Barnbergcr and Co., 1~3 
N. J. 180, 8 At.2d 291 (1939) wherein the court statt>d: 
"how a person is to d!c~t<'rm;ne the legality of 
the price of a competitor is not declared and the 
impracticality if not irnpossibilit)' of determining 
the legality of a competitor's price is ob,·ions." 
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POINT II. 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER OR 
TO RULE UPON THE SECOND DEFENSE OF 
SKAGGS TO COUNT III OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT 
WITH RESPECT THERETO WHICH CONCLUDED 
THAT THE GIVING AWAY OF AN ITEM OF MER-
CHANDISE IN CONNECTION WITH A SALE IS 
IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE UTAH UNFAIR 
PRACTICES ACT. 
Count III of plaintiff's complaint alleged that on 
or about June 20, 1966, Skaggs advertised a carton of 
cigarettes for $2.73 and gave a cigarette lighter away 
free with t>ach purchase of a carton, which lighter cost 
f-lkaggs .25 each. The carton of cigarettes alone was not 
a sale below cost as defined by the Act but the price 
of the combined articles, cigarettes and lighters, was a 
sale below cost as defined by the Act. In answer to this 
Count, Skaggs contended that the facts alleged did not 
eonstitutv a violation of the Act since the giving away 
of an article of merchandise in connection with a sale 
is not prohibited by the Act. The trial court held that 
the facts alleged in Count III of plaintiff's complaint did 
not eonstitutf> a violation of the Act because the sale of 
the cigarettes alone was not a sale below cost as defined 
h>· the Act and the gift of the cigarette lighter was not 
prohibited by the Act. The Supreme Court did not con-
sider this defense of Skaggs to Count III of the com-
plaint although the matter was presented to the Supreme 
Comt on appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
trial court on this point should be affirmed. 
Prior to the 1965 amendment of the Act, the first 
sentence of Section 13-5-9 of the Act read as follows: 
''~'or the purpose of preventing evasion of the 
provisions of this Act, in all sales involving more 
than one item or commodity and in all sales in-
volving the giving of any concession of any kind 
whatsoever (whether it be coupons or otherwise) 
the vendors or distributors selling price shall not 
be below the cost of all articles, products, com-
modities, and concession included in such transac-
tions." 
The emphasized portions of the Act which precluded 
the giving away of items were deleted by the 1965 legis-
lature and the Act as it now reads does not prohibit 
giveaways. In ach of thefollowing cases, the courts have 
held that Unfair Practices Acts do not prohibit the giving 
away of items in connection with salPs unless the Act 
in question specifically prohibits such action: State vs. 
Tanker Gas, Inc., 250 Wisconsin 218, 26 N.vV. 2d (1947); 
United Retail Grocers Association vs. IIarrisoH & Sons, 
Inc. 89 Pa. D&C 294 (1954); State of Mi11nesota vs. Avple-
baurn's Food Market, Inc., 259 Minnesota 209, 106 N.W. 
2d 896 (1960). 
As this court so forcefully pointed out in its opinion 
in this case, it is not the province of thP court to pass 
upon the wi~dom of legislation. The court should volun-
tarily restrain itself by holding strictly to an exercise 
and expression of its power to interpret and adjudicate. 
The court should state what the law is, not what it thinks 
it should be. Prior to 1965 the Utah Unfair Practices 
Act prohibited the giving away of items in connection 
with a sale. The legislature amended the Act in 1965 
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and eliminated this prohibition. Regardless of what the 
court thinks concerning the wisdom of this amendment, 
the conrt should not rewrite the statute and thereby 
follow the example of unrestrained judicial activism 
practiced by certain other courts. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW OF TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO 
COUNT IV OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WHICH 
FOUND THAT THE SALE IN QUESTION WAS NOT 
MADE BY SKAGGS WITH THE INTENT AND 
PURPOSE OF UNFAIRLY DIVERTING TRADE 
FROM A COMPETITOR OR OTHERWISE INJURING 
A COMPETITOR BUT WAS MADE WITH THE 
SOLE PURPOSE OF INDUCING THE PURCHASE 
OF OTHER MERCHANDISE BY ITS OWN CUS-
TOMERS AND WHICH CONCLUDED THAT A SALE 
MADE WITH SUCH AN INTENT COULD NOT BE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED BY THE LEG-
ISLATURE. 
With respect to Count IV of plaintiff's complaint, 
the trial conrt found that on June 16, 1966, Skaggs ad-
YNti st"d in the Provo Daily Herald the sale of Vimanal 
Vitamins at 82¢ per lmndred tablets, which was less than 
(:Ost as dt•fined by the Act. In the Provo, Utah trade 
an•a Vimanal Vitamins are offered for sale exclusively 
hy Skaggs and Skaggs has no competitor with respect 
to this item. This sale of Vimanal Vitamins was made by 
:-lkaggs with the intent of inducing customers at its Provo, 
r tali store to purchase other merchandise, bnt was not 
done with the intent and purpose of unfairly diverting 
tnuk from a competitor or otherwise injuring a com-
J>ditor. The trial court conclnded that the Utah Unfair 
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Practices Act is unconstitutionally arbitrary and un-
reasonable in prohibiting a sale belo'v cost as defined by 
the Act where the only intent of the retailer in pricing 
the item below cost is to induce customers of the retailer 
to purchase other merchandise. The Utah Supreme 
Court did not consider this defense of Skaggs to Count 
IV of plaintiff's complaint or the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the trial court with respect thereto, 
altough the matter was presented to the Supreme Court ' 
on appeal. It is respectfully submitted that the decision 
of the trial court on this point should be affirmed. 
To begin with, Skaggs agrees entirely with the opin-
ion of the court in this case that the legislature has the 
power to prohibit sales below cost, which are made with 
the intent, or which have the effect ,of overwhelming or 
destroying competition. That, however, is not the situa-
tion which exists with respect to Count IV of plaintiff's 
complaint. The statute purports to prohibit a merchant 1 
in setting the price for his merchandise and in advertis-
ing that price, even though the merchant had no intent 
to divert trade from a competitor or otherwise injure 
a competitor and even though neither of these results 
occurred. The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of 
Pride Oil Co. vs. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183, 
370 P.2d ~55 (1962) that Article I Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution prohibits invasions of a person's right to 
own and enjoy property and that this includes the right 
to sell it and to let others know of the desire to do so 
and the price. The court in that case properly recognized 
that this right is not absolute and that when it appears 
necessary for the protection of somemore important in-
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terest of the public, which involves the safeguarding of 
its health, morals, safety, or welfare, this basic right 
may be limited to the extent necessary to protect the 
public interest. 
"But a pivotal consideration in the problem 
before us is that in order to justify encroachment 
on the8e rights, such a danger to the public must 
exist and the statute must he such that it will have 
some substantial and reasonable relationship to 
thP elimination or correction of the evil." 
Most courts which have considered the question have 
held that a balnket prohibition against sales below costs 
is unconstitutional. A statute to be constitutional must 
only prohibit sales below cost which are made with an 
evil intent or which accomplish an evil result. Kansas 
i:s. Fleming Co., 184 Kansas 674, 339 P.2d 12 (1959). 
Englebrecht vs. Day, 201 Oklahoma 585, 208 P.2d 538 
(1949), Commonwealth v. Zasloff, supra. As stated by 
the Colorado SnprPme Court in Perkins vs. King Soopers, 
l11r., 122 Colorado 263, 221 P.2d 343, (1950): 
''Our stnclv of the decided cases leads to the 
conclusion that· a statute attempting to prohibit all 
8ales below cost would be unconstitutional, and 
to avoid this result, only such sales may be pro-
hihifrd which are intended to injure the public 
in a manner warranting the exercise of the police 
power." 
The Trial conrt found that Skaggs in making the 
sales complained of in Count IV of the complaint had 
no intent to infairly divert trade from a competitor or 
otherwise injure a competitor and plaintiff at no time 
contended that either of these results were accomplished 
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by the sales. Plaintiff, in fact, never contended that 
Skaggs intended to unfairly divert trade from a com-
petitor or otherwise injure a competitor in connection 
with the sales complained of in Count IV of plaintiff's 
complaint. Under these circumstances, the decision of 
the trial court insofar as Count IV of plaintiff's com-
plaint is concerned should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
OR RULE UPON THE DEFENSE OF SKAGGS THAT 
THE UT AH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF ITS UNJUSTIFIABLE 
DISCRIMINAION BETWEEN PARTIES SIMILARLY 
SITUATED ALTHOUGH THE MATTER WAS PRE-
SENTED TO THE SUPREME COURT ON APPEAL. 
The trial conrt concluded that the Utah Unfair Prac-
tices act is unconstitutional in its unjustifiable discrim-
ination between persons similarly situated. The Utah 
Supreme Court failed to consider or discuss this attack 
upon the constitutionality of the statute. It is respect-
fully submitted that the decision of the trial conrt on 
this point should be affirmed. 
A statute is unconstitutional as being discriminator~· 
and in violation of the equal protection and due process 
clauses of both the federal and state constitutions if it 
differentiates between classes of persons similarly situ-
ated without any reasonable basis hearing on the purposl' 
sought to be accomplished by tlw statute. State vs. 
Packard, 122 Ut. 369, 250 P.2d 5ril (1952); Slater 1·s. 
Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 20G P.2d 153 (1949); Gro11-
lund vs. Salt Lake City, 113 Ft. 284, 104 P.2d -±ii4 ( Hl48). 
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Several cases from other jurisdictions have held unfair 
practices acts unconstitutional because of such discrim-
ination. e.g. Kansas vs. Consumers' Warehouse Market 
' Inc., 185 Kans. 363, 343 P.2d 234 (1959); Wayne's Dis-
tribidors, Inc., vs. Tilton, 7 N.J. 349, 81 At.2d 786 (1951); 
Serrrr vs. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 
N.E.2d 91 (1947). 
The Utah Unfair Practices Act unconstitutionally 
discriminates between the ordinary retailer and the large 
manufacturer-retailer. The ordinary retailer is pro-
hibited from making a sale below costs as defined by the 
Act, except where he endeavors, "to meet the legal prices 
of a competitor." U.C.A. 13-5-12( d) 
The sales of a large manufacturer-retailer are ex-
empted from the provisions of the Act where they meet 
"prices established in interstate competition regardless 
of cost.'' This broad exemption granted to the manu-
facturer-retailer which is not permitted the small, ordin-
ary retail merchant, is in complete opposition to the 
avowed purpose of the Act ·which is set forth in 13-5-17 
of the Act as follows: 
"ThP k>gislatnre declared that the purpose 
of tl1is Act is to safeguard the public against the 
creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to 
fostPr and encourage competition, by prohibiting 
unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair 
and honest competition is destroyed or prevented." 
This unreasonable discrimination between the ex-
(·mptions granted the manufacturer-retailer and the 
ordinary retailer is in direct conflict with the purpose 
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of the Act and makes the Act unconstitutional under the 
rules laid down by this court in State 1'S. Packard, snpra. 
The Act also discriminates without n·ason between 
retailers who receive cash discounts on their purchasp 
of merchandises and those who receive trade discounts. 
In determining the minimum pricP at which a rdail<'r 
may sell his goods, the statute permits a retailer who 
receives a trade discount to deduct the trade discount 
from the invoice price in determining the minimum price 
at which he can advertise his goods for sale. The retailer 
who receives a "customary cash discount" ma~· not d('-
duct this discount from his invoice price, howenr. 'rhis 
merchant will thus be required to sell his goods at a 
higllPr price than his competitor who received a trade 
discount in spite of the fact that the net costs of the 
items to the two retaih~rs is identical. It is impossible 
to d0termine what reason tlwn• could possibly be for thi8 
distinction. As this court held in the case of Sleater vs. 
Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 206 P.2d 153 (19-±D), "If WP 
are unable to find any reasonable basis for the classifica-
tion, then we cannot sustain the Pnactnwnt." 
POINT V 
THE SUPREME COURT APPARENTLY OVER-
LOOKED THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL ES-
TABLISHING THE FACT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE 
TO PROVE THE ACTUAL COST OF SELLING AN 
ITEM OF MERCHANDISE AND ESTABLISHING 
THAT CREDITS AND REBATES CANNOT BE AP-
PLIED TO AN ITEM OF MERCHANDISE AT THE 
TIME A RETAILER SETS THE PRICE OF THAT 
MERCHANDISE FOR SALE. 
It was the contention of ~kagg:-: that th<· Ftal1 1·nrair 
PradicPs Act was unconstitutional lweau:-:u it erf'akil 
an irrebutable presumption that a retailer's cost of doing 
business is 6% of the invoice price of the goods. While 
the language of the Act indicates that the pre~mmption is 
not conclusive, the presumption is, in fact, conclusive 
as shown by the testimony at the trial. Attributing a 
"proportionate part of the cost of doing business" to an 
item of merchandise sold by a modern retail merchant 
handling hundreds of different items is impossible. The 
Supreme Court apparently overlooked the testimony at 
the trial concerning this matter and the findings of fact 
of the trial court with respect thereto. 
'!'he Supreme Court in this case held that the term 
"c:ost" was not unconstitutionally arbitrary, unreason-
able, vague and ambiguous and that the 6% markup 
l'<'quired by the statute did not create an unconstitutional, 
irrebutable presumption. The reasons given by the Su-
preme Court for this holding were that the trial court's 
eonclnsion that the 6% presumption provides no real 
alt1:•rnative because it is impractical or impossible to 
prove actual cost was not supported by the evidence; the 
eo:;t computation required by the Act need not be exact; 
all that the statute requires is that a cost figure be 
anivPd at by reasonable accounting methods; a reason-
ably accurate allocation of rebates and free goods given 
to retailers could be made for the purposes of complying 
with the Act, and therefore, the Act is sufficiently clear 
to recp1ire compliance . 
It appears that the Supreme Court overlooked the 
findings of the trial court with respect to these points, 
01· tlw testimony at the trial which supported these find-
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ings. The trial court found that Skaggs offers for sale 
a wide variety of merchandise, each item of which has 
individual cost factors, such as variance in consumer 
demand, rate of turnover, advertising cost, warehousing, 
marking, packaging, displaying, purchasing costs, de-
preciation, labor, overhead and administrative costs. In 
addition, Skaggs receives trade and cash discounts with 
respect to some items, some of which cannot be deter-
mined or are even known to Skaggs at the time the goods 
are priced for sale. Skaggs used sound, accepted and 
practical accounting procedures with as much emphasis 
on detail as feasible, but it cannot reasonably be required 
to establish accounting procedures whereby its actual 
cost per item sold can be determined at or prior to the 
offering of such item for sale. These findings are simply 
supported by the testimony at the trial in this case. 
In determining the price at which an item of mer-
chandise is to be sold Section 13-5-7 ( b) ( 3) pro vi des that 
the retailer is to take his invoice cost, deduct from this 
all trade discounts except customary disco1mts for cash, 
and then add 6% of the resulting figure to cover the 
proportionate cost of doing business. In actual practice, 
the retailer rpay not even knmY the amonnt of the trade 
discounts which he is to dednct from the invoice until 
long after the goods have been sold. Mr. Edwin K 
Austin testified at the trial that a retailer often receives 
free goods and rebates on his purchases after the end 
of a quota period, depending upon the volnnw of sales 
dnring the quota period. The amonnt of th<>se disconnt~. 
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or whether the retailer will even receive a discount is 
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unknown to the retailer until long after he has sold the 
merchandise. (R. 90-91). It is apparent that the Supreme 
Court misread this testimony in reaching its conclusion 
that these rebates and free goods could be computed by 
a retailer with reasonable accuracy for the purpose of 
pricing his merchandise. 
Dean Randall of the University of Utah College of 
Business testified in detail as to the difficulty encount-
ered in attempting to attribute a "proportionate part 
of tht> cost of doing business" to a particular item of 
n1Prchandise. He concluded: 
"In my opinion, in a retail store handling 
thonsands of items, it wonld b0 economically im-
possible to arrive at a r0alistic cost of selling 
each ikm.'' (R. 11 G) 
It is not, as the Supreme Court concluded, a question of 
"inconYenience or difficulty in application of the cost 
standard" which is involved in this case. The applica-
tion of the cost figure required by the statute is one that 
i:-: "economically impossible" to comply with. The statu-
tory presumption that a retailer's "cost of doing busi-
ness'' is 6% of his invoice price thns becomes conclusive. 
It is well established that a statutory conclusive pre-
snmption is unconstitutional. Alder vs. Board of Ed1t-
rntio11, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.ed. 517 (1952). As 
~·fated by the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of 
I'rrkins vs. King SoopPrs, Inc., supra, in holding a con-
('lusin presumption of the Colorado Unfair Practices 
c\d nnconstitutional: 
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"A legislatiw right to drclare that proof of 
one fact shall ht> prt•sumptive or prima facie evi-
dence of another is no longer open to serious dis-
pntP in this jmisdictoion or elsewhc->re. [citing 
cases] It may also be said in the light of the fore-
going authorities that the power wskd in the 
legislature to create such presumptions is subject 
to the qualification that there must be some ra-
tional eonnection or reasonable relation between 
the fact proved and the ultimate fact to be estab-
lished; Also, s1tch poiucr is subject to the further 
limitation that the presumption cannot be made 
a conclusive one. (Emphasis is that of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court.) 
POINT VI 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OVERLOOKED CON-
TROLLING PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE UTAH UNFAIR 
PRACTICES ACT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS. 
The trial court concluded that the Aet is uncomti-
tutionally vague and ambiguous in defining the pro-
hibited intent of a retailer as making a salt~ at less than 
cost as defined in the act with the intent and purpose 
of "unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or other-
wise injuring a competitor." The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed this decision of the trial court in the following 
language: 
"LikewisP ·we diPagree witl1 the trial court dr-
cision that the terms "1mfairl.'; diverting tradl' 
from a competitor'' and "in.inrmg a competitor'' 
are vague and amhig1 1 011s. 11hP t('rms may prP-
sent diffic11ltiPs in ap1>lication, hnt such difficnJt:· 
is not sufficient to hold tlw ad nneonstitntional. 
In faet, the Paid tPrms luff(' coin<' to hw<' <1<>finit 1' 
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and certain meanings in the practice of wholesale 
and retail business." 
If the terms did, in fact, have definite and certain 
meanings in the wholesale and retail business, the terms 
would not be vague and ambiguous and subject to consti-
tutional attack. In fact ,however, the terms have no 
meaning whatsoever in the wholesale and retail business. 
1'here is not a shred of testimony in the record that they 
have a definite and certain meaning or that anyone has 
any idea as to what the terms mean. 
The Supreme Court acknowledges that the terms 
may present "difficulties in application." It is this diffi-
culty in application, arising out of the terms used, which 
causes the Act to be unconstitutional. The basic test 
of constitutionality which the Supreme Court apparently 
overlooked in this case and which it should have applied 
is that laid down by this court in the case of State vs. 
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). There the 
court stated: 
"A statnte which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ ns to its application violates 
the first essential of due process of law ... " (Em-
phasis is that of Petitioner) 
The difficulties of application of the statute which 
are recognized by the Utah Supnm1e Court make the 
statute too vague to inform a retailer what his conduct 
must be in order to avoid violating the Act; make the 
Ad too indefinite to inform a retailer accused of violat-
ing its provisions what constitutes the offense with which 
21 
he is charged; and prevents uniform interpretation and 
application of the Act by those charged with enforcing it. 
It thus violates the basic test of constitutionality laid 
down by the Utah Supreme Court in the State vs. Pack-
ard case as follows : 
"ConcPrning the cpwstion of uncertainty or 
vagueness of statutes, the anthorities seem t'o h~ 
in accord that the test a statute must meet to be 
valid is: It mnst bP sufficiently definite (a) to 
inform persons of ordinar~·1 intelligence, who would 
be law abiding, what their conduct must be to con-
form to its requirements; (b) to advise a defend-
ant accused of violating it just what constitutes 
the offense with which he is charged, and ( c) to 
be susceptible of uniform interpretation and ap-
plication by those charged with the rPsponsibility 
of applying and enforcing it." 
POINT VII 
THE SUPREME COURT MISREAD THE PRESUMP-
TION OF ILLEGAL INTENT WHICH IS CREATED 
BY SECTION 13-5-9 (2) OF THE UTAH UNFAIR 
PRACTICES ACT AND APPARENTLY 0 VER -
LOOKED THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL AND 
CONROLLING PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW CONCERNING SUCH PRESUMPTION IN CON-
NECTION WITH COUNT VI OF PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT. 
Section 13-5-9 (2) of the Utah lfofair Practices Act 
provides that proof of a limitation of quantity coupled 
with proof ·of a sale below cost as dPfirn~d by the Act 
creates a presumption that the purpose or intent with 
which the sale was made was to "injure competitors or 
destroy competition." The section provides: 
"(2) Undt>r this section, proof of limitation of 
the qnantity of an~- nrtic1P or product sold or 
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offered for sale to any one customer of a quantity 
less than the entire snpp1y thereof owned or pos-
sessed by the seller or which he is otherwise au-
thorizPd to sell at the place of such sale or offer-
ing for sale, together with proof that the price 
at which the article or product is so sold or offered 
for sale is in fact below its cost, raises a presmnp-
tion of the pnrpose or the intent of the sale being 
to injure competitors or destroy competition, and 
is unlawful. ... " 
The Supreme Court apparently misread the pre-
sumption which is created by this Section. In its opinion 
on this point, the court stated: 
"A sale by the respondents at the low cost 
with the limitation of quantity obviously disre-
gards both profit and turnover which combined 
constitute the whole purpose of being in business. 
1-Gvm the most simple analysis would then lead 
all reasonable persons to conclude that the re-
spondents had an intent by this activity to attract 
customers into the store upon the expectation that 
they wonld purchase other items not marked be-
low cost." 
The section does not crt>ate the presumption that the sale 
was made with the intent of including the purchase of 
other merchandise. Tlw intent which is presumed by 
the statute is that the retailer intended to "injure com-
petitors or destroy competition." 
The constitutionality of a statutory presumption de-
]H'nds upon whether the fact presumed may be fairly 
inferred from the fact proYen. Tot vs. United States, 
:319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 519 (1943); Aldrr 
1 s. Board of Editcation, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. 
Ed. 517 (1952). To paraphrase the Utah Supreme Court 
in the instant case, even the most simple analysis wo11ld 
lead all reasonable persons to conclude that the respond-
ent had an intent by this activity entirely different from 
the intent which is presumed by the statute. 
Even assuming hat the presumption of illegal intent 
created by Section 13-5-9 (2) was constitutional and 
could be fairly inferred from the facts proven, the court 
has overlooked the testimony of Skaggs at the trial that 
there was no illegal intent involved in connection with 
Count VI of plaintiff's complaint. Count VI of plain-
tiff's complaint alleged that on June 20, 1966, Skaggs 
advertised Polaroid Swinger Cameras at $13.49 each, 
which were at less than cost as defined by the Act, and 
that Skaggs limited the purchase of tlwse cameras to 
one per customer. The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. 
Austin concerning this matter was that the cameras were 
offered for sale by Skaggs to introduce customers to a 
new store which was opened at 8th West in Salt Lake 
City. The advertisement was made to get people to come 
in and look at and become acquaint0d v\Tith the new 
store. The reason that the cameras w<:>re limited to one 
per customer was that Polaroid Cameras at that time 
were on allocation by the manufactnrer and the suppl:· 
was therefore limited. Skaggs felt thl'y 'rnulcl haH 
enough cameras to supply the demand if the camNas 
were limited to one per customPr. Skaggs fplt it wa' 
jnstifiecl in limiting- one canwrn per customer so that ii 
"·ould be able to supply all of its customers in that 
area. Mr. Austin also testified that it is often neeessar: 
"·hen offering an item at a partienlarl.v attractive pricv 
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to limit the quantity to be sold to one per customer in 
order to prevent raids by competitors who attempt to 
come in and purchase the entire stock of that item. 
(H. 88-90). The Supreme Court apparently overlooked 
this undisputed testimony in connection with Count VI 
of plaintiff's complaint. 
POINT VIII 
THE SUPREME COURT APPARENTLY OVER-
LOOKED ITS OWN PRIOR DECISIONS IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT 
DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE XII, SECTION 20 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
It was the contention of Skaggs and the decision 
of the trial court that the Utah Unfair Practices Act is 
an unconstitutional price fixing statute in violation of 
Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. This 
decision of the trial court was reversed by the Utah 
Snpreme Court on appeal. 'l'he reasons given by the Su-
preme Court were (1) That there "\Vas no evidence as to 
whctlwr there was a real alternative of a lesser cost and 
(2) the Legislatun~ has not been precluded by the Utah 
Constitntion from price fixing. 
As pointed out in Point V of this brief, there was 
amrile testimony at the trial to support the finding of the 
trial court that there was no real alternative of proving 
a lesser cost. The testimony of Dean Randall which is 
quoted above, was that it was "economically impossible" 
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to arrive at a realistic cost of selling an item of mer-
chandise. The retailer thus has no alternative but to fix 
the minimum price for his merchandise at the im'oice 
cost plus 6% dictated bv the statute. 
The Supreme Court in holding that Article XII, 
Section 20 of the Utah Constitution does not apply to 
the Legislature, has apparently overlooked its own prior 
decisions which have relied on Article XII, Section 20 in 
holding acts of the Legislature to be unconstitutional. 
In 1961 the Utah Legislature enacted Sections 41-11-
45 and 46, which regulated and restricted service station 
advertising of gasoline prices. 'T'he ostensible purpose 
of the statute >vas to prevent false and misleading adyer-
tising. The constitutionality of these sections were 
attacked in the case of PridP Oil Co. vs. Salt Lake Coiwty, 
13 U.2d 183, 370 P.2d 355 (1962). The Utah Supreme 
Court found that the real purpose of the statute was the 
control of gasoline prices and the elimination of gas wars. 
The Supreme Court held the act of the Legislature uncon-
stitutional and the only constitutional provision cited 
by the Utah Supreme Court was Article XII, Section 20 
of the Utah Constitution. 
In the ·case of General Electric Company vs. Thrifty 
Sales, 5 U.2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956), the Constitution-
ality of the Utah Fair Trade Act ·was attacked as being 
in violation of Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Con-
stitution. The contention was made in that case, "that 
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tht> constitutional provision, obviously aimed at private 
combinations from indulging in price fixing for mono-
polistic purposes, was not intended to prevent the legis-
ia tnre from enacting laws authorizing agreements for the 
wholesome purposes set forth above." This contention 
was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. The court 
stated that it was clear that retailers could not volun-
tarily enter into contracts with each other to fix the price 
of merchandise. The Act, however, purportedly furnished 
them with a device whereby retailers were forced by 
8tatute to set minimum prices for the sale of their mer-
ehandi st', which they could not have done by private 
agreement. The court held, not only that the contract in 
question was unconstitutional, but that "the act is invalid 
under Section 20, Article XII of our constitution." 
In Gammon vs. Federated Milk Producers Associa-
tion, Inc., ll U.2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018 (1961), the Utah 
~npreme Court stated that if the Utah Agricultural Co-
operative Act were construed as authorizing the estab-
lishment of minimum prices for milk that the Act itself 
wonld he unconstitutional as heing in violation of Article 
XII, 8ection 20 of the Utah Constitution. 
'l'he majority opinion of the Supreme Court in this 
case apparently overlooked its prior decisions which held 
legislatin price fixing unconstitutional in violation of 
Article XII, Section 20, of the Utah Constitution. As 
ably i1ointed out in tht~ dissenting opinion of Justice 
l'~llett in this case, and by Chief Justice Crockett in the 
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General Electric Company case, supra, retailers contd 
not by an agreement among themselves compell each 
other to charge a minimum price for their merchandise. 
It would clearly seem unconstitutional for the legis. 
lature to pass a law compelling retailers to do that which 
would be unconstitutional for them to do otherwise. 
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